

CSCI-UA.9480

Introduction to Computer Security



Session 3.1

Understanding and Preventing Vulnerabilities


Prof. Nadim Kobeissi

What does it mean for software to be secure?

Let's consider a social network app.

- Pictures posted by a user can only be seen by that user's friends (*confidentiality*)
- A user can like any given post at most once (*integrity*)
- The service is operational more than 99.9% of the time on average (*availability*)


Sound familiar? Same words, but meaning is context dependent (cryptography vs. application security.)



What is a security failure?

The system can be coerced into a state in which it does not achieve its security goals.

- Can be due to a software programming error.
- May be due to a design error in the protocol specification.
- No error in the software at all, but rather user error.



Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures.

U.S. national repository of software vulnerabilities.

- Most bugs eventually obtain their own “CVE.”
- Operating systems bugs, web application bugs, etc.



Diving into a CVE: CVE-2014-3205.

All Seagate BlackArmor NAS contain a hardcoded-password.


- Anyone could log in using the password “!~@#%\$%FREDESWWSED”
- Followed by another separate CVE, [CVE-2014-3206](#) which allowed anyone to execute arbitrary code by sending a HTTP request to a PHP file.



Bugs are everywhere.

So I built my own NAS.


- ...which runs OpenSUSE.
- [CVE-2011-3172](#): Log into any disabled user account in SUSE Linux.
- You can't ever avoid bugs in the long run, only *minimize your attack surface*.




Heartbleed: another notable bug.



Heartbeat – Normal usage



Heartbeat – Malicious usage



Leaked 2018 CVE list.

LEAKED LIST OF MAJOR 2018 SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

- CVE-2018-????? APPLE PRODUCTS CRASH WHEN DISPLAYING CERTAIN TELUGU OR BENGALI LETTER COMBINATIONS.
- CVE-2018-????? AN ATTACKER CAN USE A TIMING ATTACK TO EXPLOIT A RACE CONDITION IN GARBAGE COLLECTION TO EXTRACT A LIMITED NUMBER OF BITS FROM THE WIKIPEDIA ARTICLE ON CLAUDE SHANNON.
- CVE-2018-????? AT THE CAFE ON THIRD STREET, THE POST-IT NOTE WITH THE WIFI PASSWORD IS VISIBLE FROM THE SIDEWALK.
- CVE-2018-????? A REMOTE ATTACKER CAN INJECT ARBITRARY TEXT INTO PUBLIC-FACING PAGES VIA THE COMMENTS BOX.
- CVE-2018-????? MYSQL SERVER 5.5.45 SECRETLY RUNS TWO PARALLEL DATABASES FOR PEOPLE WHO SAY "S-Q-L" AND "SEQUEL"
- CVE-2018-????? A FLAW IN SOME x86 CPUs COULD ALLOW A ROOT USER TO DE-ESCALATE TO NORMAL ACCOUNT PRIVILEGES.
- CVE-2018-????? APPLE PRODUCTS CATCH FIRE WHEN DISPLAYING EMOJI WITH DIACRITICS.
- CVE-2018-????? AN OVERSIGHT IN THE RULES ALLOWS A DOG TO JOIN A BASKETBALL TEAM.
- CVE-2018-????? HASKELL ISN'T SIDE-EFFECT-FREE AFTER ALL; THE EFFECTS ARE ALL JUST CONCENTRATED IN THIS ONE. COMPUTER IN MISSOURI THAT NO ONE'S CHECKED ON IN A WHILE.
- CVE-2018-????? NOBODY REALLY KNOWS HOW HYPERVISORS WORK.
- CVE-2018-????? CRITICAL: UNDER LINUX 3.14.8 ON SYSTEM/390 IN A UTC+14 TIME ZONE, A LOCAL USER COULD POTENTIALLY USE A BUFFER OVERFLOW TO CHANGE ANOTHER USER'S DEFAULT SYSTEM CLOCK FROM 12-HOUR TO 24-HOUR.
- CVE-2018-????? x86 HAS WAY TOO MANY INSTRUCTIONS.
- CVE-2018-????? NUMPY 1.8.0 CAN FACTOR PRIMES IN $O(\log N)$ TIME AND MUST BE QUIETLY DEPRECATED BEFORE ANYONE NOTICES.
- CVE-2018-????? APPLE PRODUCTS GRANT REMOTE ACCESS IF YOU SEND THEM WORDS THAT BREAK THE "I BEFORE E" RULE.
- CVE-2018-????? SKYLAKE x86 CHIPS CAN BE PRIED FROM THEIR SOCKETS USING CERTAIN FLATHEAD SCREWDRIVERS.
- CVE-2018-????? APPARENTLY LINUS TORVALDS CAN BE BRIBED PRETTY EASILY.
- CVE-2018-????? AN ATTACKER CAN EXECUTE MALICIOUS CODE ON THEIR OWN MACHINE AND NO ONE CAN STOP THEM.
- CVE-2018-????? APPLE PRODUCTS EXECUTE ANY CODE PRINTED OVER A PHOTO OF A DOG WITH A SADDLE AND A BABY RIDING IT.
- CVE-2018-????? UNDER RARE CIRCUMSTANCES, A FLAW IN SOME VERSIONS OF WINDOWS COULD ALLOW FLASH TO BE INSTALLED.
- CVE-2018-????? TURNS OUT THE CLOUD IS JUST OTHER PEOPLE'S COMPUTERS.
- CVE-2018-????? A FLAW IN MITRE'S CVE DATABASE ALLOWS ARBITRARY CODE INSERTION. [~~~CLICK HERE FOR CHEAP VIAGRA~~~]

Categories of Vulnerabilities

3.1a

Memory Management Vulnerabilities.

- Most modern programming language have “memory management.” Some expect the user to manage memory allocations manually and later de-allocate.
- *Buffer overflows*: an out-of-bounds memory index allows operations on unintended memory addresses.
- *Dangling pointers*: a program re-accesses memory that was since deallocated.





Test your knowledge!

Which of the following languages implements *garbage collection* and *memory management*?

- A:** Go.
- B:** C.
- C:** C++.



Test your knowledge!

Which of the following languages implements *garbage collection* and *memory management*?

A: Go.

B: C.

C: C++.

Structured Output Generation Vulnerabilities.

- Output generated by one component relies on dynamic variables, but must remain in a safe structure when processed by the receiving component.
- *SQL injections* are the most popular example.
- Can apply to command-line shells, to web scripts...





Test your knowledge!

How can this query be exploited in order to perform an SQL injection attack?

```
query = "select * from users  
where name='"+ name +"' and  
pw = '"+ password +'"
```



Test your knowledge!

How can this query be exploited in order to perform an SQL injection attack?



Race Condition Vulnerabilities.

- *On a file system:* an attacker can squeeze an operation between the time permissions on a file are checked and an action is undertaken.

Seen often in programming languages focusing on concurrency (Go, or perhaps even JavaScript with Web Workers.)




API Vulnerabilities.

- Missing access control on critical API functionality.
- Denial of service by using the API against itself.

LILY HAY NEWMAN SECURITY 07.28.17 12:05 PM

HOW NETFLIX DDOS'D ITSELF TO HELP PROTECT THE ENTIRE INTERNET



Side-channel Vulnerabilities.

We saw these when discussing cryptography.

- Power analysis can leak entire private keys.
- Timing analysis can also leak entire private keys.
- Rowhammer: maliciously crafted memory access patterns triggers reactions in high-density RAM memory cells that causes memory bits to flip.



Prevention of Vulnerabilities

3.1b

Language safety.

Perfectly well-described software means bug-free software.

- Most bugs are software not doing what we intended for it to do and computers taking us too literally.
- Garbage collection, memory management.
- Static type systems, bound checks.
- Namespace localization.



Better programming practices.

Almost completely language dependent.


- Remember to manage your pointers in C.
- Don't use `eval()` in JavaScript.
- Don't use `system()` in C.

There's an infinite number of these rules and they come largely with experience.



Typing and verifiably parsing structures.


- Language Integrated Query (LINQ.)
- Regular expression types.
- Verified parsing and serializing.



Avoiding race conditions.

One relatively new method: ownership regimes.


- Multiple pointers to the same resource can be created only in certain circumstances.
- Rust is the first mainstream programming language to incorporate this.



Safe API design.

It all comes down to design.

- Libsodium's entire existence is about offering a cryptography API where it's "harder to shoot yourself in the foot."
- For web APIs, compartmentalization, defensive programming play a large role.
- Implementing pre-condition and post-condition checks on APIs.



Detection of Vulnerabilities

3.1C

Static detection.

- Code analysis (automated or manual).
- Symbolic verification by building an Abstract Syntax Tree.
- Flow evaluation.



Dynamic detection and fuzzing.

- Monitoring programs and using statistic analysis.
- Black-box fuzzing: a barrage of arbitrary values over an unknown internal program structure to “see what happens.”
- White-box fuzzing: internal program structure is known, allowing optimizations to improve coverage.



Formal verification.

- For protocols, symbolic or computational verification (ProVerif, CryptoVerif, etc.) allow us to write up models that describe protocols and obtain automated proofs.
- My PhD involved translating web protocol code to formal models in ProVerif.
- F*: a new language for writing formally verified software. Dependent types, refinements, post-condition logic, etc. (ties ML to the Z3 SMT theorem prover.)





Did you know?

Microsoft Research is using F* in order to build the aptly-named Project Everest, a fully formally verified HTTPS stack.

Next time:
Control Flow
Hijacking

3.2